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Jason S. Ridler 
Emergence: Towards a Historiography of Canadian 
Defence Research during the Second World War 
Abstract 
The Second World War forced Canada to become a nation with effective 
defence research assets, and these assets were among the nation's many 
contributions to victory in 1945. The historical literature on these 
developments has been slow to develop though it is now becoming an 
increasingly popular field of study. This premier historiography attempts to 
chart how and why the writings on Canada's defence research efforts during 
the Second World War have grown, its various forms of discourse, and its 
major themes, controversies, and deficiencies. 
Résumé 
La Seconde Guerre mondiale a obligé le Canada à se doter de capacités 
éprouvées de recherche en matière de défense, des capacités gui, avec de 
nombreux autres apports du Canada, ont d'ailleurs contribué à la victoire en 
1945. Bien que des études historiques de ces questions aient pris du temps à 
démarrer, elles sont devenues de plus en plus populaires. Cette première 
historiographie vise à décrire comment et pourquoi des écrits sur les efforts 
de recherche de défense du Canada pendant la Seconde Guerre ont pris de 
l'ampleur, ainsi que leurs diverses formes de discours et leurs principaux 
thèmes, controverses et lacunes. 
Introduction1 
The SeGond World War forced Canada to create modem and impressive 
defence research capabilities. The national application of science, industry, 
and technology towards military ends was an integral component of Allied 
victory over the Fascist powers of Europe and Imperial Japan. Canadian 
politicians, engineers, soldiers, and scientists organized their talents 
towards this end, and contributed to such projects as the proximity fuse, 
modern radar, and atomic weapons research, to name but three.2 These 
efforts were primarily directed through two government bodies, the 
National Research Council (NRC) and the newly formed Department of 
Munitions and Supply (DMS). In six years of struggle, Canada emerged as a. 
first class defence research power, one that would parley these strengths 
into the technologically defined Cold War.3 
The historiography of this development is problematic to trace for three 
related reasons. First, defence research is scattered among many historical 
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fields, including military, political, science, technology, and industry and 
business history. Each has its own modes of analysis, pedagogical 
demands, and professional direction. Second, the story of such efforts is 
often scientifically and technologically complex, thus most historians in 
traditional fields mentioned have preferred more familiar subjects. Third, 
the records on defence research have, until recently, been classified. 
Despite these difficulties, a sizable body of literature on Canada's 
defence research efforts exists. The history of Canadian defence research 
during the Second World War developed through four related, yet distinct, 
streams. Modest and uncritical official, institutional, and popular accounts 
dominated the first from the end of the war until the early 1960s. Canadian 
military historians defined the second stream from the late sixties onward, 
including defence research aspects in their works on Canada's war effort. 
Canadian historians of science and technology defined the third stream, 
which ran parallel to the second through the 1970s. The fourth, from the 
1990s to today, coexisting with the second and third, has been defined by 
commemorative works from modern Canadian defence research 
institutions who have traced their origins back to their wartime parent. No 
stream grew in isolation, many works fit between these streams, and all 
such historical demarcations are subject to challenge. But they provide a 
starting point. 
Prime Minister W.L. Mackenzie King entrusted the National Research 
Council (NRC)'s C.J. Mackenzie and the Department of Munitions and 
Supply (DMS)'s CD. Howe with the responsibility of defence research for 
the war and this allowed him to avoid concerning himself with the materials 
of war, which he loathed.4 In 1915, Britain had created a committee on 
scientific and industrial research and recommended that the Dominions do 
likewise. In 1916 Canada set up an Honorary Advisory Committee for 
Scientific and Industrial Research, soon to be called the National Research 
Council (NRC). Given the still latent industrial potential of the nation, by 
war's end the eleven members of the Committee had only just performed 
the rudimentary task of creating their organization. The NRC survived the 
war, and under the guidance of Chairman Dr. Henry Marshall Tory, and his 
successor Major-General A.G.L. McNaughton, established facilities, 
including laboratories, in time for the Second World War. When 
McNaughton returned to active duty in 1939, he maintained his position as 
president but the role was actually filled by acting president, Dr. C.J. 
Mackenzie.5 Mackenzie's established the NRC as the main research station 
for all three services by 1941.6 He remained president of the NRC until 
1952.7 
The Department of Munitions and Supply (DMS) was created in April 
1940 to replace the inadequate War Supplies Board as the chief government 
department responsible for procuring munitions and organizing the 
nation's resources toward the war effort. CD. Howe was given the 
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portfolio. An acclaimed engineer and engineering teacher with a 
photographic memory and incredible capacity for work, Howe was given 
the largest powers of any minister in the war, essentially free to create and 
control national agencies, and the freedom to do with it as he saw best. 
Howe excelled at the task.8 Howe's energy and leadership was essential to 
Canada's success on the industrial front.9 
Stream I: Institutional and Popular Accounts, 1945-1966 
Government research institutions wrote the first works on wartime defence 
research to ensure their efforts were not forgotten. Such legacy works are 
characterized by generalized accounts of vast projects, complimented by 
technical data and photographs. While useful, they are uncritical and often 
brazenly so about the efforts of the organizations during the war. 
The NRC War Years 
The NRC published the first such work in 1946, with The War History of the 
Division of Biology. This monograph focused on food production, 
preparation, and refrigeration techniques, critical to British survival after 
the fall of France and during the Battle of the Atlantic. Other projects 
included research on biological indicators for war gas, finding natural 
resource substitutes for war supplies like rubber and alcohol, and 
developing the "tropicalization" of rations and equipment for Canada's 
aborted role in the Pacific War. It ends with the discussion of Canada's 
effort to feed a starving Europe in the aftermath of the war, including 
solving the problem of canning kosher foods for Europe's desperate Jewish 
population.10 
Two years later the NRC released its war history of the radio branch, 
responsible for developing radar. The short narrative tells of Britain's 
spring 1939 decision to include the dominions in its "RDF" (Radio 
Detection and Finding) efforts. The head of NRC's radio section, Dr. J.T. 
Henderson, represented Canada at the first of these meetings in London, 
and by the start of the war the NRC had, at the behest of President 
McNaughton, begun its work on radar development for the armed services. 
This history briefly describes the organization of the branch and its radio 
model shop section, relations with Munitions and Supply crown 
corporation Research Enterprise Limited, work done with University of 
Toronto, McGill, Queen's, and Western, and the various projects 
undertaken for the armed services.! ' 
These institutional histories are helpful for basic understandings of the 
division's projects and management, but they provide no critical insight 
into the problems each division faced. They provide the reader with the 
basics of the organization's efforts that can, and should, be challenged as 
more scholarly work on the people, processes, and products associated with 
the NRC's war work is written. 
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More rigorous histories of the NRG's war effort were planned, especially 
the Chemicals Division, which had consumed almost half of the NRC's 
labour and resources during the war. But the difficulty of translating the 
complex subject into readable prose confounded the authors of the era. 
Compounded by the general disinterest of many NRC scientists to take on 
historical work, the plan of more rigorous NRC histories on the war years 
would lie dormant for decades.12 
Similar development occurred in creating the official two-volume 
history of the Department of Munitions and Supply. Written over four years 
by department member J. de N. Kennedy, it catalogues the department's 
phenomenal growth under the stewardship of CD. Howe.13 Defence 
production and defence research were intimately related throughout the 
war, and Kennedy's sweeping work catalogues the many research projects 
connected with the ministry's branches, crown corporations, and controls. 
The DMS had two chief defence research branches. The first was the 
Army Engineering Design Branch, created 9 July 1941, tasked to keep up 
with changing technical demands in light of battlefield experience. It 
contained four directorates: Directorate of Signals Design, Directorate of 
Automotive Design, Directorate of Metallurgy, and Directorate of Tank 
Design. Contractors did most of the engineering and drafting. Automotive 
and tank design were of primarily US origin given the need for 
standardization of parts and US experience in this field. This branch also 
worked with the Ford Motor Company (Canada) and GM of Canada in the 
developmental stage to iron out problems before beginning mass 
production. The Directorate of Metallurgy started the nascent armour 
creation capability in Canada of armoured steel, working with the Ore 
Dressing and Metallurgical labs of thé Department of Mines and 
Resources. There was also an Automotive and Tank Production Branch and 
by 1941, Canada was the main source of mechanized transport in the British 
Empire. After the fall of France, tank design in Canada moved from 
piecemeal to complete construction, including the thinly armoured and 
soon obsolete Valentine tank, among others. These efforts pushed the 
nation to the limits of its technical infrastructure. The successful 
management of these research efforts is, alongside production, a large part 
of DMS's successful war work.14 
The second defence research unit was the Chemicals and Explosives 
Branch, deeply responsible for the ammunition program's success. Allied 
War Supplies Corporation, a crown corporation, was created to supervise 
the construction, management, and opération of chemical, explosive, and 
ammunition plants. The branch also maintained a Research and 
Investigations division, which primarily looked at alternative uses of 
natural resources in chemical explosives, such as using Canadian wood 
pulp instead of cotton linters as a source of cellulose for nitrocellulose 
manufacture. The branch managed most industry-critical resources, 
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including those used in offensive and defensive chemical warfare 
measures.15 
Kennedy also highlights the projects developed in cooperation with the 
NRC, who largely provided initial research on projects while DMS worked 
on production methods. These joint ventures include, gun-laying radar (GL 
radar systems), the RDX super-explosive, No. 58 Wireless set, or "Walkie 
Talkie," polymers and plastics, optics, taking over the NRC's jet propulsion 
project in 1943, and more. Canada's atomic power projects at the Montreal 
Laboratory and Chalk River, as well as the takeover of Eldorado Co. as the 
chief uranium supplier in Canada, are also briefly covered.16 
But Kennedy's work suffers greatly from how it was written, and large 
parts of Canada's industrial front were left incomplete.17 Leadership, the 
role of personalities, and the complex relationship between research and 
development and final production are mentioned but not scrutinized, 
compared, or evaluated. This history is what historian Reinhardt Ruurp 
classified as "company history," a project that cannot embarrass those it 
portrays because of its structure and intent; thus much of the story behind 
the story, the how and the why so crucial to historical analysis, remains 
hidden.18 
In part, Kennedy's work suffers from poor research and limited sources. 
It was based on project summations made by the organization during the 
war that he revised, though it is unclear when or where the revisions 
occurred. It also relied heavily on the booklet prepared by DMS's Director-
General of the Publicity Branch, Rielle Thomson, entitled The Industrial 
Front. Parts of this pamphlet, he notes, were incorporated "with little or no 
change."19 It was also a rushed and incomplete history. As Kennedy noted, 
By 1946 the majority of the personnel of the Department had 
returned to their peacetime occupations, the files were not easy to 
find and the Department of Reconstruction and Supply had taken 
over the remaining duties and functions of the Department of 
Munitions and Supply. For these and other reasons, it has been 
extremely difficult to piece together a comprehensive account of 
the work of some of the units of the Department and any attempt at 
documentation has been out of the question. I hope the reader will 
make generous allowances for the shortcomings of some of the 
chapters.20 
Kennedy's work, while not void of value, is merely a survey from a 
collection of surveys on the DMS's vast war projects, and not a rich, 
scholarly product.21 
By the 1960s, popular works on wartime science were being produced, 
for example, Scientists at War, an unofficial history of the NRC's war efforts 
by Wilfred Eggleston, a respected journalist and NRC enthusiast. 
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Eggleston's readable work provides a narrative spine to the evolution of 
Canada's weapons research programmes. Chapters focus on radar; the 
proximity fuse; RDX and other explosives; atomic energy; service specific 
research projects (de-gauzing of ships; winterization of equipment); 
materials and food; and medical research.22 
Eggleston provides the first account of the NRC's chemical war (CW) 
research and the efforts of Chemical Division chair, E.W.R. Steacie. The 
creation of the Experimental Station at Suffield, Alberta for testing 
chemical munitions and gear, and the importance of Dr. Otto Maas of 
McGill University, one of the chief scientists of the war, is discussed.23 
Suflfield's was a critical Canadian contribution to wartime research. Britain 
did not have the space for the large test areas that chemical war research 
required. Canada's geography proved, yet again, a tool for security.24 
Eggleston fails to mention, however, that Suffield was a joint Anglo-
Canadian effort, and among its more important Superintendents were 
British scientists who had worked at Porton Down CW research 
establishment. 
The book also describes Canada's contribution to more discrete 
technological developments, from the problems of the "Weasel" winter war 
vehicle, modified to marshland conditions and used in North West Europe, 
to the failed attempt to produce the bizarre, British-requested, sea-going 
"Ice Fortress" known as Habbakuk,25 and many points in between.26 For 
Eggleston, C.J. Mackenzie, Sir Frederick Banting, Charles Best, Otto 
Maas, D.J. Henderson, E.W.T. Steacie, S.J. Cook, and others were the 
dominant personalities of Canada's wartime research. 
The difficulties each personality, faced within Ottawa, or with allies, or 
the terrible failures associated with the Royal Canadian Navy's withdrawal 
for service in the North Atlantic in 1943, are absent. Eggleston is, clearly, an 
NRC booster, and not a critic. As such, Canada's "middle power" position 
between their chief allies is described in positive terms of contribution, 
though relations were far from smooth. British concerns over Canada's 
intellectual and scientific ability to make meaningful contributions to allied 
projects, especially towards the British-pioneered radar, were real and had 
to be overcome. What changed such opinions was Canada's actual 
performance in radar and RDX production. Eggleston also touches on 
Canada's fight for critical resources during the period of US neutrality and 
British scarcity. Humbly, Eggleston argues, via a baseball analogy, that 
Canada's contribution was, that of 
... a player who repeatedly contributes to smart fielding 
manoeuvres [sic] throughout the game, including participation in a 
couple of vital triple plays, one who gets up to bat at a critical 
moment and drives in a run. A player who cannot be described, of 
course, as the outstanding star of the game, since that honour 
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belongs to the star pitcher, the "Babe" Ruth of the outfield, but 
whose assistance stands out as an essential ingredient of victory.27 
Like Kennedy, Eggleston vetted his work before his subjects. Indeed, it 
could not have been written without the consent of Mackenzie, Maas, and 
the rest of the NRC establishment, which the author also acknowledges.28 
Objective analysis and the rigor demanded by scholarly approaches to 
history are, if not absent, muted in the enthusiastic telling of this tale. Like 
Kennedy's book, it is a well of information not a foundation stone. Unlike 
Kennedy, it is a highly readable account of key personalities and policies of 
Canada's wartime science efforts. 
In 1959, Captain D.J. Goodspeed published an official history of the 
Defence Research Board of Canada, the postwar inheritor of the NRC's 
defence research obligations and responsibilities. It included a brief 
summary of the NRC's role during the war, primarily in coordinating the 
nation's defence research efforts in the services, academia, and industry, 
and its phenomenal growth. Goodspeed also includes the defence research 
units of the services developed during the war and would eventually be part 
of the postwar Defence Research Board.29 This last official history of 
science in government does not deviate from the arguments of any of the 
previous accounts to any great measure. 
Stream II: Defence Research in Canadian Military History, 
1960-1990 
By the end of the 1960s, Canadian military historians were taking a keener 
interest in defence research. Unfortunately, this coincided with military 
history's decline as a field of study in Canada. As such, wartime defence 
research developed as a small part of the much grander picture of Canada's 
war effort, exemplified by John Swettenham's three-volume biography of 
General A.G.L. McNaughton, one of Canada^s first soldier-scientists. 
McNaughton's concern and contribution to defence research throughout 
his prestigious career is charted. C.J. Mackenzie, who wrote the foreword, 
noted that McNaughton, as president of NRC between 1935 and 1944 was 
"twenty-five years ahead of his time in his understanding of the part applied 
science was to play in modern industrial technology."30 His term as NRC 
president, while initially unpopular with the scientists, nonetheless laid 
down much of the pre-war preparations the council required to grow into 
the nation's principal research agency, including increasing its ties to the 
Department of National Defence.31 
However, with the General's hands on Swettenham's shoulder, the 
author rarely challenges the subject. McNaughton argued that his removal 
as Chief of the General Staff and appointment to president of the NRC was 
not, as many have suggested, a response to the unpopularity of the labour 
camps he had organized during the heart of the depression, but a sage and 
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strategic move by then Prime Minister R.B. Bennett to prepare Canada for a 
future war with Germany.32 
While the verity of this argument is unsupported by documents, 
Swettenham demonstrated that McNaughton did organize the NRC to 
pursue both pure and applied science in projects that directly or indirectly 
had a military value: the cathode ray direction finder, photographic 
sciences, ballistics, optics, etc. He also initiated a chemical warfare section 
to develop counter-measures such as gas masks, fortuitous given the Italian 
use of poison gas in Abyssinia and Britain's warning that Canada had to 
supply their own gas masks if war came.33 Swettenham's book remains the 
first attempt by a Canadian military historian dealing with the Second 
World War to include Canada*s defence research efforts as part pf their 
story. Two years after the publication of McNaughton's biography, another 
"official" work would lay claim to being the best overall book on Canada's 
war policies in the Second World War. 
The only other biography of substance on wartime science is Michael 
Bliss's Banting. While best known as the co-discover of insulin, Sir 
Frederick Banting was also Canada's most popular scientist before his 
premature death in 1941. Like McNaughton, he feared German advances in 
science for a coming war in the 1930s. Banting made distinct contributions 
to the G-suit, and was a firm believer in research into chemical and 
biological weapons, though his judgment about their value as a weapon was 
disputed.34 The war work of Charles Best has generated some biographies 
and historical analysis of Best's role in blood banks and medical science 
during the war, all of which were more substantial than Banting's war 
work.35 
In 1970, C.R Stacey published Arms, Men, and Government: The War 
Policies of Canada, 1939-1945. Stacey, Canada's preeminent military 
historian, took eleven years to write this definitive work, which remains the 
magnum opus of his career. It has yet to be surpassed in its breadth and 
tactful objectivity assessing the King government's confusing, often 
contradic- tory, yet successful war policies, including its review of defence 
research efforts. These largely concern the army's interest, and this focus is 
not surprising, since Stacey had originally intended the book to deal with 
the war policies affecting the army alone.36 
Stacey's work dispassionately summarizes the major research projects 
undertaken by the NRC, DMS, and the services' research and development 
units in RDX production, the GL Mark IHC radar system, as well as the 
chemical warfare unit at the Suffield Experimental Station and atomic 
research. In short, he gives à scholarly approach to the often dangerous and 
difficult nature of defence research and defence production that is absent or 
only suggested in Kennedy's and Eggleston's work, though each of these 
authors is used as a key source.37 The coverage of the Anglo-Canadian 
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atomic laboratory in Montreal and Chalk River would soon be surpassed by 
those with greater access to files and personnel.38 Stacey clearly felt the 
need to end his book with these efforts to fill out the spectrum of Canada's 
war effort. Given the book's daunting task, it is instructive that defence 
research efforts are included at all. 
Historian Donald Avery noted that while Stacey was keen to present the 
contribution Canada made to defence research, evaluating its impact was 
difficult, if not impossible because it was just that—a contribution. It was "a 
share, and necessarily in most cases not a major share, in a great and 
complicated joint effort."39 Historians may have taken this as a warning, as 
most Canadian military history on the Second World War places defence 
research on the periphery of their work. 
Service Histories 
Unfortunately, the official histories of both the RCN and the RCAF have 
lagged behind Stacey and his assistants' efforts with the army and the 
government. It is a sad tale that cannot be recounted here.40 So, has defence 
research been left in the shadow of more dominant and numerous works on 
operations, doctrine, leadership, and the like in Canadian military history? 
Emerging from the Shadows 
At first glance, yes. Owen Cooke's eminently useful bibliography of 
Canada's military history includes many works on Canada's defence 
research during the Second World War, particularly those concerning radar 
and atomic energy, but they are not grouped together as a subject unto 
themselves.41 It is not surprising, given Cooke's task, that defence research 
has been subsumed within larger categories. Desmond Morton's more 
recent and no less ambitious short work A Militaiy History of Canada 
echoes Cooke's approach. Defence research remains, for some military 
scholars, a small, constituent part of the broader fields of military and 
political history.42 
Publish or Perish 
With the waning popularity of national and military history in Canadian 
academia over the past forty years, it is no shock that defence research, as a 
subset of military history, has also suffered. Since 1945, few historical 
publications showed an interest in defence research scholarship. Canadian 
Historical Review featured little military history let alone articles dealing 
with science and technology in a military context until the late 1970s.43 
Robert Bothwell and David Zimmerman both published works on the 
dynamics between war needs, government action, and relationship with the 
business and the services. Bothwell focused on government control of 
uranium mining and production through their crown corporation, 
Eldorado. His two definitive works on Canada's role in nuclear energy that 
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emerged from the Second World War are Nucleus: The History of Atomic 
Energy of Canada Limited and Eldorado: Canada's National Uranium 
Company, both of which cover the war years at the Montreal Lab and Chalk 
River establishment in detail.44 Bothwell and William Kilbourn also 
produced the best current biography of CD. Howe, providing a personal 
glimpse into defence research's most important cabinet minister.45 
Zimmerman's work details the difficult and often antagonistic 
relationship between the NRC and Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) during the 
RCN's brutal experience in the Battle of the Atlantic. Zimmerman 
produced a major monograph on the RCN's technological challenges 
during.the war, The Great Naval Battle of Ottawa. Unlike Eggleston, 
Zimmerman takes a critical stance on the relationship between state 
agencies such as the NRC, DMS, and Research Enterprises, Ltd., 
examining the NRC's failures in management and application of science on 
radar and sonar. C.J. Mackenzie's leadership, while still critical, is also 
challenged.46 While Zimmerman's work was critiqued for some very 
discrete factual errors,47 it also represents a more objective and critical view 
than the official histories. 
Defence research has found more robust representation in more specific 
academic and professional journals. Canadian Military History began in 
1990. While focused pn traditional military history topics, it has published 
. on technology and its development in war. Most of these discussions are 
outside the boundaries of this article,48 but CMHhas also championed other 
defence research issues: for example, political accountability of the RCN's 
technological failings in 1943; the RCN's challenge with the role of 
anti-submarine warfare (ASW) in the Battle of the Atlantic; and the 
development of the "Franks Flying Suit," used to offset the G-forces RC AF 
and RAF fighter pilots faced throughout the war.49 It is hoped that this ethos 
continues. 
Canadian Defence Quarterly (CDQ), a professional military journal, 
was revived after a forty-year hiatus in 1971 as the professional forum for 
discussing modern Canadian defence issues. Military history was always 
included, and until its end in 1998, CDQ contained some work of military 
history. Primarily a modern defence journal, CDQ maintained a distinct 
interest in Canadian defence research matters.50 Greg Stewart explored 
Canada's initial role in jet engine creation though various Crown 
corporations during and after the war, and its sad decline in the wake of the 
Avro Arrow debacle.51D.A. Fraser described his own wartime recollection 
of the creation and use of Leigh Light in the RCAF's anti-submarine 
operations in the North Atlantic.52 Historian Marc Milner offered a telling 
glimpse of the difficulties the RCN faced in recovering from its 
"technological back- wardness" during the Battle of the Atlantic, as it 
sought new and better asdic-sonar equipment and weapons like the British 
"hedgehog" mortar system to combat the U-boats.53 The journal's 
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professional offspring, Canadian Military Journal, has maintained this 
historical and defence research ethos and, hopefully, will soon publish more 
works that involve the two.54 
Milner's piece represents a crossover point into the next stream of this 
historiography. Milner, one of Canada's foremost naval historians, chose to 
present this piece at the Canadian Science and Technology Historical 
Association s annual Kingston meeting in 1989. Indeed, the burgeoning 
field of the history of science and technology has provided defence research 
scholarship a new home. 
Stream III: The Growth of Canadian Science and Technology 
History, 1978-1990 
While historical works on science and technology predate the development 
of these disciplines,55 it was not until this past half century that American 
and then Canadian universities created programmes, departments, and 
journals that investigated the history of science, technology, and 
medicine.56 Military topics were also examined.57 
Canada's roots in this field start at the 1972 Montreal meeting of the 
Canadian Historical Association (CH A), which featured, for the first time, 
a session on the history of Canadian science. This served as the starting 
point for what, in 1980, became the Canadian Science and Technology 
Historical Association (CSTH A). This group developed into a professional 
academic organization, establishing regular conferences and a peer 
reviewed journal,58 Scientia Canadensis. From the outset, it published 
works on defence research during the Second World War. Zimmerman 
continued his work on the nature of technological change in the RCN, 
including comparative analysis with the Australian Navy wartime 
experience.59 Work on wartime medical research is growing thanks to work 
by Canada's Alison Li and the US's Terri Romano on NRC medical work.60 
Jean-Louis Trudel has written on the war's impact on the development of 
professional engineering at the University of Toronto, complementing 
Richard White's recently published history of U of T's Faculty of Applied 
Science and Engineering.61 The nation's chemicals history is also 
represented, including the war years, again focusing on RDX production.62 
The outrageous, controversial and, in hindsight, silly Habbakuk "ice fleet" 
project has also garnered more attention now that documents have been 
declassified.63 There appears no indication that CSTHA will lose its interest 
in promoting analysis of wartime defence research. 
NRC Redux 
Many original CSTHA members were NRC archivists, scientists, and 
historians who worked on correcting the deficiencies in the NRC official 
histories. In 1976 archivists Bruce Marshall and Alf Ticker established the 
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NRC History and Archives Project, which would include publishing books 
on the war work of all the major divisions.64 Most were completed by the 
mid eighties, giving a much more rigorous view of all the divisions.65 The 
exception, again, was the chemistry division.66 
These archivists also organized the NRC oral history series. These were 
taped interviews with NRC members and key scientists, including those of 
the war years. While unavailable for this work at time of writing, they are, 
by virtue of their existence, a valuable part of the defence research story, 
though how valuable will depend on the topic, scientists, and quality of 
answers provided on any of the 100 plus tapes. 
In 1975 Mel Thistle, NRC member and writer, released a collection of 
private and formerly classified letters from C.J. Mackenzie to General 
McNaughton, 1939-1943. These were Mackenzie's personal attempts to 
keep McNaughton, still president of the NRC, informed and aware of the 
council's efforts. The letters were selected with the consent and help of 
Mackenzie himself, who contributed the introduction and epilogue. This 
correspondence provides a rare, if limited, look at how Mackenzie ran the 
NRC. He discusses the difficulties and successes in almost every major 
division, the strain and benefit of working with allies, the need to 
concentrate on projects with quick returns to aid the war effort, and a host 
more. Among the more engaging insights is the NRC's fight with the Civil 
Service Commission, whose own interests concerning labour, rather than 
brainpower, clashed with the NRC's need for the best minds and most 
skilled hands in Canada working on defence research projects.67 Mackenzie 
reveals his views on topics ranging from GL radar development and the 
RCN,68 alliance tension with the US and Britain regarding the perception of 
quality of Canadian sciences,69 and dead-end projects such as Habbakuk, 
wooden plane production, and camouflage for naval vessels.70 
The letters are a valuable contribution to the history of Canadian defence 
research for the insight they provide on Mackenzie's thinking at the time. 
Zimmerman's work partially refutes the sanguine picture presented here, 
which is all for the good as Thistle is clearly a champion of Mackenzie. Still, 
these letters provide fascinating insight into Canada's wartime science 
management from it chief science tsar. 
The saga ofNRC's chemical and biological efforts has, on the other hand, 
found an author outside its institution. John Bryden's Deadly Allies is the 
first major monograph using previously classified documents at the 
National Archives of Canada as well as the National Research Council to 
deal with the nation's chemical and biological war effort. Canada's role in 
creating anthrax and developing various countermeasures is told with 
enthusiasm. We also get new interpretations on the roles of Mackenzie, 
Maas, and Banting, all of which are perhaps more controversial than they 
needed to be. Maas is particularly cited as a figure of perhaps dubious 
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character. Bryden is good at exploring his personality, though one is left 
feeling uneasy about the man. A fuller Maas biography that builds on the 
work done by Eggleston and Bryden will, hopefully, not be long in the 
making. 
The touchstone in the field of defence research in this stream is Donald 
Avery's 1998 The Science of War: Canadian Scientists and Allied Military 
Technology during the Second World War. Culminating nearly twenty years 
of work, Avery's book covers most of the major projects Canadian 
scientists participated in during the war and that have already been touched 
upon in other works.71 But Avery gives a readable, scholarly, and objective 
reading where there had only been general, popular, or controversial 
accounts of such efforts as the Experimental Station's chemical sprays or 
anthrax production facilities at Grosse île, Quebec. The critical and often 
obfuscated contribution of Canada's universities in defence research is also 
laid out in detail, particularly the chemical work done at McGill and the 
University of Toronto. Avery's greatest contribution is his close exam-
ination of Alliance politics, which only the Mackenzie-McNaughton 
wartime letters had previously emphasized. The role of successful liaison 
scientist in Canada, such as Sir James Chadwick with the atomic energy 
projects at the Montreal Lab and Chalk River, are presented as critical to 
Canada's successful participation in the defence research side of the war. 
Avery argues that Mackenzie envisioned Canada's role in atomic science 
going beyond the war. To do this required maintaining saliency with its 
allies so that Canada would maintain access to the best minds, technology, 
and breakthroughs in harnessing atomic power, while maintaining a focus 
on immediate war needs. Avery ends his work with discussion of Canada's 
technical-scientific relations with the Soviet Union and the impact of Soviet 
espionage in the defence research arena, a rather awkward way to finish his 
tale.72 But that is a minor quibble. The Science of War will likely remain the 
decisive work in the field for some time. 
Indeed, Avery's focus on the human relationships involved in defence 
research gives his work an accessibility often missing in defence research 
works. The C.J. Mackenzie presented in this work is more sanguine than 
Zimmerman's portrayal, but it certainly avoids some of the gloss in the 
NRC histories. More time is spent on the relationship with US research 
establishments and projects, friction and cooperation with such US science 
tsars as Vannevar Bush at the National Defence Research Committee 
(NDRC), later the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD). 
American work on this relationship clearly places Canada on the periphery 
of research endeavours, though important parts of the periphery. Avery has 
helped establish that for the complete story of defence research to be told, it 
requires a Canadian perspective. 
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Stream IV: Commemoration 
Modern defence research institutions, whose heritage stretches back to 
those war days, have taken an interest in commemorating as well as 
remembering these efforts since the 1970s. These works are not scholarly. 
But given the limited volume of resources on Canadian defence research, 
many provide a focus and starting.point on a series of intriguing aspects of 
defence research during the war 
The most thorough and informative works in this stream are J.W. 
Mayne's four works on operational research (OR) in the three services 
during the Second World War, written in the early and late 1970s. Mayne, a 
member of the Department of Defence's Operational Research and 
Analysis Establishment (ORAE), originally wrote three histories of OR in 
the Canadian military, one for each service, in 1970. These were informal 
institutional histories primarily concerned with understanding how current 
OR units in each of the services developed. Mayne discussed the major 
hurtles and successes, reports and activities, that each establishment made. 
These documents remained classified for internal use until the early 1990s, 
and much of the data pertains to the postwar period, but the origins of 
military OR in Canada during the Second World War is covered, although 
with scant detail. Like Kennedy's work, it is an effort to catalogue rather 
than analyze the hows and whys of the services' OR efforts.73 
By 1978, Mayne had compiled these three efforts into a two-volume 
work, Operational Research in the Canadian Armed Forces During the 
SecondWorld War. This comprehensive work should serve to guide further 
research into the totality of military OR as it was developed and practiced in 
the services.74 The RCAF OR units for both East and Western Commands 
were involved in developing quantitative methods of evaluating 
operational performances in such areas as bomb damage assessment, 
efficiency in attacks on U-boats, and answering issues of discrepancies in 
navigation logs.75 The RCN's ORG activities were smaller than the other 
services, focused primarily on anti U-boat operations, including the 
development of countermeasures against the German's acoustic torpedo, 
and, at war's end, processing and communicating information gathered 
from prisoners taken from U-889, including information on captured 
German weapons and devices.76 The army's ORGs included a gamut of 
activities and establishments across Canada, and no doubt the army's 
enthusiasm for OR activities can be attributed to McNaugton's support for 
such work to be done. There were ten CAORG detachments in total, five in 
Canada, and five overseas. The activities of the domestic CAORG 
detachments included cooperation with other government bodies in work 
ranging from entomological surveys (study of bugs and malaria) to 
meteorology (using radar to study weather patterns), to training staff in 
Morse code, gauging the quality of tanks' sight, and many more.77 
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John Longard served as a naval reserve officer in Halifax during the war, 
where he contributed to the degaussing project (the reduction or elimination 
of magnetic fields around ships) of the RCN that led to the creation of the 
Naval Research Establishment (NRE). After the war, he served as the 
Scientific Advisor to the Commander, Maritime Command, as well as a 
Scientific Liaison Officer in Washington. Before his death in 1977, 
Longard completed his own commemorative work of the establishment he 
had helped build, Knots, Volts, and Decibels: An Informal History of the 
Naval Research Establishment, 1940-1967. Using such sources as NRC 
scientist George E. Henderson's unpublished manuscript, "Wartime 
Memories of Canadian Naval Research," as well interviews and 
photographs from the NRE's own collections, Longard's work covers the 
role defence research played in the Atlantic theatre with some degree of 
detail.78 
While lacking depth, Longard also discusses the friction and problems of 
the research done at NRE. The pictures of captured U-boats and discussion 
of Henderson's view of the NRE's trials and tribulations alone make up for 
Longard's lack of comprehension which, as the title suggests, is not the job 
of "informal" histories. Longard's work has been complemented by 
another informal history of the establishment's efforts, 1968-1995,79 and 
indeed many of the postwar defence research establishments have recently 
looked back and produced documents on their historical journey. 
Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC), Canada's current 
defence research organization, has made their in-house histories available 
through their website or via purchase. The history of the Defence Research 
Establishment Ottawa includes a brief but important summary of the 
organization's origins in pre-war Chemical Warfare Laboratories under 
direction the Dr. E.A. Flood of NRC's chemistry division. Included are 
brief discussions on the pre-war creation of the Respiratory Assembly Plant 
(RAP) and the charcoal testing laboratory in Ottawa, the gel fuel 
flame-thrower project, and the 1941 handing over of chemical warfare 
responsibilities to the Directorate of Chemical Warfare and Smoke, though 
under Flood's leadership.80 But most other commemorative histories, such 
as those on Canada's Armament Research and Development Establishment 
(CARDE) in Valcartier, or the Office of Counsellor Defence Research and 
Development (London), are primarily concerned with the Cold War.81 
No Day Long Enough, edited by George Lindsey and released in 1997, is 
both a limited and useful commemorative work. This collection of essays 
and reminisces of defence research efforts during the war was initiated by 
Lindsey in the wake of preparing a symposium to honour Dr. Omond 
Solandt, one of Canada's preeminent defence scientists and science 
organizers.82 The success of the conference and the desire of the 
contributors to create more documented efforts on the role of Canadian 
scientists in the Second World War led to No Day Long Enough.*3 
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Each chapter and vignette covers some part of the vast array of projects, 
from the growth and financial support of the NRC during the war, to more 
discrete technological hurdles involved in radar development, RDX 
production, and the scientific and technical needs of each service. The 
atomic power developments and the ever-strange Habbakuk project are 
also covered. Portions of the work are merely abstracted from the works of 
Eggleston, Mayne, Longard, Goodspeed, and NRC documents, but given 
the status of defence research, this is not surprising. In fact, it is encouraging 
that an attempt was made to bring new and old material together in a rather 
novel form that includes two professional historians, L. W.C.S. Barnes and 
Bill Rawlings. 
The book's greatest value is in the remembrances, such as I.E. 
Puddington's work in industrial chemistry to find substitutes to materials 
made scarce by the war, or P. W. Nasmyth's review of the difficulties the 
NRC faced in manufacturing their own cavity magnetron. Still, as memory 
serves as the key primary source here, No Day Long Enough, like the NRC 
histories, must be read with caution and diligence given the sources of data. 
The picture it presents of the NRC's conduct focuses on success and does 
not examine failure, and this leads to a one-sided argument that should not 
be taken as gospel without reading Bothwell or Zimmerman's work on 
similar subjects. 
Conclusion 
Canada emerged as a defence research power during six years of war, able 
to participate and contribute alongside its allies towards victory in 1945. As 
this historiography shows, this story has only partially been told, and many 
difficulties in exploring this history remain. Classified documents, 
difficulty of subject matter, and lack of interest have all contributed to this 
state. Still, the work that exists suggests that history of defence research in 
the Second World War is developing steam, albeit slowly, as its literature 
has grown since 1945. 
The four streams of development, from popular and official accounts, to 
the parallel streams of military history and the history of science and 
technology, to the renewed interest of institutions in commemorative 
histories, have, thankfully, a forward momentum. Hopefully this 
momentum will help inspire others to correct some of the major holes in the 
historiography. 
Of immediate concern is the lack of professional biographies on chief 
scientists of the war. McNaughton, Banting, and Best have been given 
historical treatment, but it will be impossible to assess the complete picture 
of Canada's defence research efforts without comprehensive investigations 
into the lives of C.J. Mackenzie, Otto Maas, John T. Henderson, E.W.R. 
Steacie, and others. 
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The Department of Munitions and Supply also needs more thorough 
treatment than can be given in this paper. The difficulty, of course, lies in 
getting business and official records from private and public archives, no 
easy task given business's general reluctance to allow anyone access to 
their records without a say in the final product; the fear of writing "company 
histories" remains. But the activities of such bodies as Research Enterprises 
Limited or the Army Engineering Research Branch are vital ingredients in 
knowing how Canada produced relevant war machines. Again, access to 
records may be difficult, indeed impossible.84 Until we have more data, we 
are stuck with Kennedy's assertions, which, for all we know, may be 
diluted, contradictory, or wrong. 
The historiography of these efforts, though, has a more positive 
trajectory. Military history and the history of science and technology in 
Canada have provided forums for those with an interest in research and 
writing on defence research topics. The difficulties of studying defence 
research in Canada during the Second World War are not insurmountable. 
Scholars of the history of technology have created a body of literature on the 
critical importance of contextual factors in scientific and technological 
development.85 Their emphasis on the power of personality and the 
influence of institutional and cultural factors in technological development 
may provide new tools of analysis and modes of inquiry for young students 
studying Canadian defence research. For instance, students might assuage 
the difficulty of the subject matter and create richer intellectual products on 
topics, like radar development at the NRC or the NRE, which have already 
been initiated into the field, by comparative views on service culture 
between Canada, Britain, and or the US. Whatever steps they take, new 
researchers and writers will be adding to a growing historiography that has 
developed from a peripheral element to a relatively new field of study, one 
that has grown in quality and variety through various streams of historical 
inquiry. 
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